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Introduction  
Local governments all over Europe have been exposed to New Public Management (NPM) reforms. 
Besides an administrative component, the restructurings also modernize political institutions and 
influence ways of organizing politics (Hansen). The role of the city council has changed and councilors 
have been attributed a new role as  goal-steering decision-makers. The frequent occurrence of similar 
reforms in Europe indicates that they are often regarded as success stories (Lapsley 2009). However, 
there is increasing evidence that the widespread use of NPM could be a cruel disappointment for 
governments (Lapsley :1).  
This article is built on the fundamental principle that NPM reforms do need to be evaluated with special 
attention for the outcome of the transformational process that occurs when the NPM discourse is 
implemented at the local political level. The local government field represents an interesting setting for 
investigating politicians’ behaviour. This paper investigates if there is conformity between the objectives 
of the NPM- inspired Flemish Local Government Act and the realization at micro level in the city 
councils. It examines empirically how politicians of the opposition translate the NPM discourse 
concerning transparency and timeliness into tangible agenda items during the city councils’ meetings. To 
this end, this study compares the stipulations concerning transparency and timeliness proposed by the 
legislator (Flemish government) with the implementation at micro level, concretized by the added 
agenda items of opposition politicians during the city councils’ meetings.  
Theoretical framework: focus on practice  
The ideas and ideals that animate and articulate the NPM might be well known. However, their 
elaboration in political settings and their interaction with the instruments and the people that make 
them operational, is still of considerable interest (Lapsley et al). The NPM literature has generally 
focused on the expected effects of reforms but attempts at studying the actual results often found 
significant gaps between expected and actual changes. Therefore, NPM developments cannot be 
fruitfully described or explained by only focusing on the availability of new instruments (Van Helden, ter 
Bogt 2001: 83). What really matters is how these instruments are applied in practice. Seeds of new 
practice creation lie in the everyday activities of the actors (Lounsbury: 356). These activities might 
diverge from the intended concept of management change. Arguing that substantial attention has 
already been devoted to the ideological and instrumental aspects of reforms, nowadays many 
researchers are shifting their focus to the actual practices, the impacts and the outcomes of the 
implemented programmes (Windels 2007). For example, when summing up 20 years of research, Pollitt 
calls it mildly amazing that there are only few analyses of how elected politicians use performance 
information in practice (Askim).  
‘Practice’ is indeed a complex and multifaceted concept. In the realm of action, behavior, institutions 
and society, all different elements interact. Human beings are always influenced by the context in which 
they operate. In order to genuinely understand practice variation concerning NPM reforms, we have to 
focus on individual actors (Lounsbury). Various authors have already showed that NPM should be 
studied from a more contextual, cultural and human perspective (Lapsley, Lounsbury). This more 
‘human’ approach of evaluating a NPM reform is complicated by the fact that  NPM is often simply too 
narrowly defined, and proposed as one singular and straight way of dealing and behaving. There is, 
indeed, no ‘one’ model of NPM at play, different elements are stressed and combined according to 
existing institutional structures and traditions (Hansen). Consequently, research concerning the 
application of the NPM idea in practice leads to an investigation of the everyday actions and behavior of 
the people supposed to put them at work. The closeness of politicians to the public and the actual 
services delivered may foster an attention to NPM instruments not seen at other levels of government 
(Moynihan 2010: 862). This article will focus on the opposition members in local city councils, it will be 
shown that their behavior is an appropriate indicator of how a NPM-like reform of Flemish local 
government is enacted. 
Focus on politicians of the opposition 
The aim of this paper is to reveal the result of the transformational process that NPM has undergone 
from the initial discourse proposed by the Flemish regional government to the actual practice in local 
councils. In order to show this translation, we consider local councilors as indicators of change (Brugué 
& Vallès). The councilors are political protagonists and their actions in the council may be used as a 
privileged indicators of result of the translation process.  
In theory, the city council is considered as the center of the local democratic decision making process. 
However, executive politicians (members of the board of mayor and aldermen) often have a knowledge 
advantage and seem to overrule the council. Therefore, various elements in the Flemish local 
government act attempt to improve the role of the councilors. However, the discussions in the councils 
often relate to interventions from the opposition. Councilors of the majority are often very invisible in 
the council, they have to adhere to the party line. Local party associations nominate candidates with 
appropriate preferences, if the expressed preferences diverge too much from the party line, the 
candidate risks losing votes by sending mixed signals (Serritzlew: 332).  
Thinking globally, acting locally 
This ‘outcome’ focus on a local government reform implies that the discourse proposed by the Flemish 
regional government is picked up (in one way or another) by opposition councilors and results in some 
kind of ‘more NPM-like’ behavior. In our case this means a growing attention for transparency and 
timeliness. Consequently, the initial idea travels from the regional government (the so called ‘non-local’)  
through agents and intermediaries within the cultural and political context to the councilors (the so 
called ‘local’). We use the terms ‘local’ and ‘non-local’ to capture this interaction between the highly 
specific settings in which accounting operates and the much broader reform processes that are at work. 
(Lapsley et al : 1).  
Recently, Kurunmäki, Lapsley and Miller (2011) emphasized the importance of examining the reciprocal 
relations that form between the local and the non-local. They underline the need for more empirical 
approach to this matter. Hood demonstrated nearly two decades ago, that there is considerable 
variability in the extent to which and the way in which NPM reforms embed themselves in specific 
national settings. According to Lounsbury (2008) (cited by Van Helden & Ter Bogt 2011: 58), the 
dynamics of practice can be studied by revealing the multiple logics and tracing the changes in these 
logics. Especially for local government, NPM reforms cannot be evaluated without looking at the 
political component. Elected representatives' support and participation gives “political weight” to the 
reform and plays an important role in integrating NPM instruments in decision-making. Consequently, 
they will have to accept the needs and benefits of the NPM concept and support its implementation 
(Tat-Kei Ho).  
Research question  
This paper focuses on the outcome of the transformation that the NPM idea undergoes when it moves 
and translates from the regional government to the politicians of the opposition in the local councils. 
According to Lounsbury (2008: 351), this relation between actor micro-processes and institutions (the 
context) provides an important opportunity for theoretical development and empirical insight in order 
to open up this multi-level, meso range of research (Lounsbury: 2008: 351). NPM is a part of a greater 
and wider social trend, the ‘economization’ (Diefenbach). We live in an area of ever increasing number-
orientation, measurement fever and so called ‘rational’ or ‘neutral’ concepts. However, it still remains 
questionable  if municipalities are being managed more businesslike than before. How is the reform 
adapted at the heart of the public decision-making, in the city council?  Do we notice an ‘economization’ 
of acting in the council by opposition members ? Do the opposition members refer to elements related 
to transparency and timeliness? What is left of the original NPM idea concerning timeliness and 
transparence after it has been modeled by the political context of Flemish municipalities? 
This research focuses on the gap between the ideas of the reformers (Flemish government) and the way 
in which opposition councilors, influenced by powers and local tactics, put them at work. How is the new 
public management idea, propagated by the Flemish government, carried out by councilors of the 
opposition in the council ? Is their behavior affected by the NPM discourse? Indeed, there is no ‘one’ 
model of NPM at play, NPM can be defined as a ‘shopping basket’ from which reformers select certain 
relevant components.  
As already mentioned, the NPM reform of local government introduced by the Flemish government 
aimed at strengthening the city council. To this end, new requirements concerning transparency and 
timeliness of information (financial and non-financial reporting, frequency of reports, reports relation to 
municipal spin-offs, …) were implemented. This part of the Flemish local government act is of particular 
importance for the opposition members to fulfill their role as critical watchdog of the majority’s policy. It 
is therefore expected that the agenda items of the opposition will contain elements referring to 
timeliness and transparency of municipal information, not only for internal purposes but also for 
external communication. 
Is there evidence, from their added agenda items during the councils’ meetings, that they valorize 
transparency and timeliness of information ? Or is there, on the other hand, proof of a non-intended 
transformation process from the original idea? Do we find clear evidence of questions and agenda items, 
proposed by the opposition related to timeliness and transparency of information ? Can we conclude 
from the analysis of these items, that the NPM idea proposed by the Flemish government concerning 
transparency and timeliness is picked up by the opposition as intended ? In other words, can we evidence 
a match between the non-locally proposed stipulations concerning transparency and timeliness and the 
way in which it is enacted through the actions of the opposition members, the local implementation ? 
Does the NPM idea concerning transparency and timeliness-as it should be- correspond with the micro 
level implementation, the situation-as it is ? Consequently, how could we explain the result ? 
Research design 
This paper aims to reveal the outcome of the transformational process that the NPM idea has 
undergone from comparing the input by the Flemish government to the output by the opposition 
councilors.  
The input, operationalized by the official stipulations concerning transparency and timeliness, will be 
examined based on interviews with persons in charge and field experts. Their information will be 
combined with the study of official documents concerning the Flemish local government act. We 
combine different sources in order to capture all the subtleties. Not only the legislative requirements 
concerning transparency and timeliness but also their intended results, not always reflected in 
documents, are considered.  
The output, the putting into practice by opposition councilors, is studied by examining the councils’ 
official reports. Indeed, the only place where opposition members’ real interpretation of timeliness and 
transparency can be investigated empirically, is in the council itself. Indicators in official documents only 
point to a formal adoption of NPM instruments. Moreover, most empirical evidence on politicians’ 
utilization of performance information stems from case studies and surveys. They have provided 
valuable insight and interesting hypotheses but little systematic evidence of levels and patterns of use 
(Askim 2007:456). Self-reporting surveys have been a widely adopted methodology, however, its 
reliability depends on the respondents’ correct understanding and subjective interpretation of the 
questions (Tat-Kei Ho: 221). Any results obtained must be viewed with caution since self-reports 
frequently do not correspond to actual use (Schiff & Hoffman: 135). Compared to documentary analysis, 
the exaggerated claims of officials responding to surveys may overestimate the actual use of 
performance information in city government (Poister & Streib: 328). Furthermore, these studies often 
probe intentions or opinions concerning performance information use and measuring attitudes does not 
necessarily tell us something about actual behaviour (Steyvers et al: 436). Therefore, this article starts 
from the city council official reports, where the behaviour of politicians is reflected. They contain the 
literal reproduction of discussions in the council and thus perfectly reproduce the dialogue between 
politicians. The reports are ‘living sources’, reflecting real political behaviour and observing the dynamics 
of local politics. They are a reliable, neutral and objective source. The city manager, an impartial public 
servant, is responsible for the correctness of the notification. Every report has to be approved by a 
majority of the councillors at the beginning of the meeting. As we found several records of councillors 
contesting the notification of their interventions, we may conclude that councillors carefully check the 
correctness of the notes. They are public documents, so media attention plays an important role in this 
issue since politicians try to prove to citizens that their interests are well being looked after (Van Hengel 
et al p 15).  
In order to enhance and to strengthen the position of elected representatives, councilors, opposition 
members included, are allowed to add own items to the councils’ agenda. These added agenda items 
should not only be clearly described, but should also contain an explaining proposal of decision. To this 
end, councilors have access to all sources of information. 
For several reasons these added agenda items of the opposition members are a particularly useful 
source for this research. Firstly, all the decisions of the ‘regular’ agenda are almost always voted 
majority against opposition and often in consensus. In other words, interventions and comments from 
the opposition do not influence the final decision. Secondly,  the agenda itself is set up by the board of 
mayor and aldermen and consists of rather administrative and technical matters (eg. public 
infrastructure, street naming, …). Therefore the discussions relating to the ‘regular’ agenda are less 
useful to detect opposition councilors’ attitude concerning transparency and timeliness. 
Consequently, the ‘added agenda items’ of the opposition offer the proper perspective to study 
opposition councilors’ behavior. They can discuss all matters of concern for the municipality, as long as 
they are relevant for the municipality and within its authority. Indeed, these proposals almost never lead 
to specific or tangible decisions. However, the distinctive characteristics of these agenda items might 
reveal if they contain elements of NPM related to transparency and timeliness. Requirements 
concerning timeliness and increased transparency of information are both central features of the NPM 
discourse proposed by the Flemish government. They are pre-eminently concepts that would appeal to 
opposition members as their role is to critically control the majority.  As they each refer to proofs of 
good management, we expect comments on this aspects from the opposition.   
Besides, the basic structure of the municipalities also changed and evolved from one central decision-
center in the municipality, the city council, to a multitude of semi-independent local agencies (police 
force, childcare, social affairs and welfare, water supply …). Timeliness and transparent reporting 
concerning their activities is of paramount importance for a sound democratic control from the elected 
representatives. 
The local council is the one and only democratic forum where the opposition can question the majority 
and make suggestions for policy improvement in presence of the (local) media and interested citizens. 
This public nature is also the reason why discussions in  separate committees  are often overdone in the 
public meeting of the council. It is par excellence the sphere of action of the opposition members. Their 
role is to be able to comprehend a subject from different points of view, to consider them, to 
compromise conflicting interests and to judge what is most reasonable and appropriate in a given 
situation (Hansen). 
In a stratified sample (according to size)  of 75 municipalities, we select …. agenda items added by the 
opposition. They are representative for the councils’ meetings, (some meetings generate more items 
than others) and for the different political parties in opposition. The year selected is 2008, all the reports 
were available at the moment of data collection. They were obtained by downloading from the 
municipalities' website. The remaining reports were sent by email after a simple request.  
Flemish municipalities as an empirical setting  
As in many other European countries, the Belgian municipalities underwent several changes during the 
last decade. In 2002, the Belgian authority over local entities was regionalized, as a consequence 
Flanders and the Walloon provinces in Belgium followed a different reform track. Every Belgian region 
(the Flemish, the Walloon and the Brussels region) now has its own Local Government Act. The Flemish 
local government act is the most innovative. Fitting with NPM attention was given to a more 
businesslike and professionalized management of local government. The reform relates to aspects such 
as organisational culture, financial management, human resources and result oriented policy planning 
and evaluation. The introduction of budget-holding, a management team, modern financial 
management and delegation to administration suggests a base for more horizontal power relationships 
and separation between politicians and administration. Most of the stipulations are compulsory, for 
example the establishment of a city management team, while others such as the implementation of 
budget ownership are optional. Because of the principally mandatory character of the Decree, the 
context in which Flemish municipalities operate is largely homogeneous. This homogeneous empirical 
setting enhances the comparability of empirical findings (de Buijn & van Helden: 410). Dependent on the 
number of inhabitants, Flemish councils have between 7 and 55 members, who are elected every six 
years. Most Flemish local councilors have ordinary jobs and are only part-time politicians. The local 
councilor without an executive mandate spends an average of 7.63 hours per week on his task as 
councilor and this for a very limited monetary compensation (Olislagers & Ackaert).  
Discussion (to be completed)  
The NPM  discourse emphasizes the utilization of specific, measurable and transparent information and 
results. It focuses on performance indicators, contract-based decisions, planning and control 
instruments, objective and tangible results and outcomes. Transparency and timeliness of information 
are of crucial importance. Especially for opposition members whose primary role is to control and 
critically supervise the majority. If the opposition members are positively influenced by this NPM 
discourse as proposed by the Flemish government, they will refer to transparency and timeliness of 
information in the added agenda items or use it as an argument in the following discussion.  
Otherwise, there may be a clear decoupling between the intended and the actual concept, as 
emphasized in myth theory and the theory of double talk and hypocrisy (Christensen & Lægreid: 5). 
There are  indeed are reasons to believe that this economic thinking does not fit the political logic, 
focused on reelection and responding to citizens’ demands. Therefore, it could be that they ignore the 
NPM discourse and continue to work in the ‘old way’. In this case,  the ‘transformational policy’ of the 
Flemish government failed because the centrally managed plans did not capture the subtleties of 
political interactions at the local level (Lapsley 2009). 
Between these two extremes we have the partial and pragmatic implementation of reform ideas, 
brought about by mechanisms such as ‘rational shopping for reform elements’ and ‘editing or 
translating of reform ideas (Christensen & Lægreid: 5). The result in this scenario is that opposition 
members do refer to transparency and timeliness but not in the intended way. They argue purely for 
political and opportunistic purposes. Such variation is typically conceptualized as stemming from actors 
acting strategically to resist institutional pressures or otherwise pretending to act in accordance with 
institutional demands while instrumentally pursuing their own agendas (Lounsbury 353). This is 
confirmed by Oliver (1991) organizations or individuals do not always blindly mimic or acquiesce 
institutional pressure (regional government, other pressures, …), but they can also try to manipulate 
institutional demands (Lounsbury 352). 
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